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Models of the macrodynamic impact of private debt tend to emphasize the role of 
corporate debt. Corporate leverage affects macroeconomic outcomes and can contribute 
to financial fragility. We show that consumer debt is also important. We  include 
consumer as well as corporate debt in a stock-flow consistent neo-Kaleckian  growth 
model and explore the macrodynamic ramifications. We find that consumer credit 
conditions influence effective demand, the profit rate, and economic growth. 
The inclusion of consumer debt as well as corporate debt in our model 
substantially  alters the model's dynamics. We compare our short-run, transition, and 
long-run results to models containing a single type of debt. Some of our results confirm 
the results of simpler models. For example, we find that a surge in animal spirits is good 
for steady-state growth. We show that consumer borrowing can also help to sustain 
aggregate demand, that looser consumer credit conditions have a steady-state growth 
effect, and that demand augmenting changes can enhance system stability. In this sense, 
looser consumer credit conditions are good for macroeconomic stability. 
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Economists have long recognized that investment-nance behavior can aect macroeconomic
performance. For example, Minsky's nancial instability hypothesis proposes that debt
dynamics contribute to macroeconomic instability (Minsky, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1995). The
nancial underpinnings of the Great Recession have generated renewed interest in nance-
driven macrodynamics.
Models of the macrodynamic impact of private debt tend to emphasize the role of corpo-
rate debt (Taylor and O'Connell, 1985; Skott, 1994; Lavoie, 1995; Foley, 2003; Hein, 2006;
Lima and Meirelles, 2006, 2007; Charles, 2008a,b). Particularly relevant to our work is that
of Hein (2006) and of Charles (2008a,b). Hein builds upon the work of Lavoie (1995) to in-
corporate interest payments on corporate debt into a neo-Kaleckian growth model. He nds
that interest-rate changes aect long-run economic growth. Charles explores the emergence
of nancial instability in neo-Kaleckian growth models with corporate debt.1 He argues that
high interest rates are a likely precondition to nancial instability. We extend this litera-
ture by developing a tractable model that encompasses the core of these earlier eorts while
simultaneously introducing a macrodynamic role for consumer debt.
Naturally we are not seeking to overturn the stylized fact that investment is more volatile
than GDP and consumption, nor the central role of investment in economic uctuations.
Rather, this paper explores the additional contribution of consumer debt dynamics to the
evolution of consumption expenditures and thus to macroeconomic outcomes. Certain styl-
ized facts suggest this contribution may be growing in importance.
From the 1980s to the mid-2000s, the US experienced consumption expansion accompa-
nied by signicant household debt accumulation. For example, the ratio of personal outlays
to disposable personal income increased from about 88 percent in the early 1980s to nearly
100 percent in 2007. Additionally, household debt outstanding as a share of GDP increased
from about 45 percent in 1975 to nearly 100 percent in 2006, falling slightly since then.2
Onaran et al. (2011) note that the rentier share of income in the US has been growing at the
2expense of both the wage share and the non-rentier prot share. The magnitude of these
shifts is startling and calls for new theoretical and empirical research on their implications.
Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) provide an informal but informative discussion of these
trends from a Minskyan perspective. They suggest that social factors, such as changes in
consumption and borrowing norms, have had important eects on the level of household
debt in the US. They argue that increased borrowing provided a substantial macroeconomic
stimulus, but that debt accumulation eventually reached untenable levels, planting the seeds
for nancial instability and a severe economic downturn. Indeed, these facts have been
broadly implicated in the \Great Recession" of 2007{2009 and its aftermath.
Minksy himself suggested that household debt could contribute to business-cycle dynam-
ics (Minsky, 1992). Yet the Minskyan emphasis was on the role of the rm, and household
borrowing played little role in his work (Papadimitriou and Wray, 1999). Most subsequent
research on macroeconomic debt dynamics has also largely neglected household debt. Yet
recent events suggest that the willingness of workers to borrow may be an important deter-
minant of macroeconomic outcomes.
In this context, Palley (1994) and Dutt (2006) are exceptional in that they formally inves-
tigate the macrodynamic eects of consumer debt. Palley develops a multiplier-accelerator
model of the cyclical aspects of consumer debt over the business cycle. A rise in consumer
borrowing initially increases consumption and thereby promotes growth. Eventually the
accumulation of debt becomes excessive: the debt-service burden constrains consumption,
which reduces output. Dutt nds somewhat dierent results in a neo-Kaleckian model: an
expansion of worker borrowing raises the growth rate in the short run, but the long-run eect
is ambiguous. In any model that acknowledges the relatively high propensity to consume
of workers, we may see such dierences between short-run and long-run outcomes. Higher
worker debt implies contractionary income-distribution eects: interest on the debt shifts
income from workers to rentiers, who have a higher propensity to save. Our model of worker
borrowing includes such distributional eects of consumer debt, and we simultaneously con-
3sider corporate debt dynamics.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. We
weave together disparate threads from the existing literature by developing a neo-Kaleckian
growth model with both consumer and corporate debt. Section 3 analyzes the comparative
statics of temporary equilibrium, while section 4 explores the model dynamics. Section 5
summarizes our results and oers some concluding comments.
2 Theoretical Framework
Neo-Kaleckian models of growth and distribution were initiated by Asimakopulos (1975) and
Del Monte (1975). Key early contributions include Rowthorn (1982), Dutt (1984), Taylor
(1985), and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Blecker (2002) provides a critical survey of later
extensions. Key features of these models include demand-driven output and growth, a role
for protability in the accumulation process, and the importance of income distribution for
macroeconomic outcomes.
A few recent contributions to this literature have examined the role of corporate debt
or, to a lesser extent, consumer debt (Dutt, 2005, 2006; Hein, 2006; Charles, 2008a,b).
These studies provide natural reference points and building blocks for our formal model.
We incorporate the dynamics of both corporate debt and consumer debt in an analytically
tractable model. The resulting model extends the neo-Kaleckian literature on debt dynamics.
In this section we lay out our accounting framework and present our basic model structure.
2.1 Social Accounting Matrices
We begin laying out the model by providing a basic accounting framework, which closely
follows Lavoie and Godley (2002). We distinguish four types of agents in this model: workers,
rentiers, banks, and non-nancial rms. To focus our discussion on the role of consumption
and investment behaviors, we model a closed economy with no government contribution to
4aggregate demand.
Table 1 is the balance sheet matrix for our model economy. It shows the asset and liability
allocations across our four types of agent. We consider three fundamental classes of assets:
physical capital (K), net loans to households and rms (DW and DF), and the net bank
deposits of rentiers (DW + DF). A column sum for a class of agent produces its net worth,
while a row sum (across workers, rentiers, banks, and rms) produces the net value of a class
of assets. Note that we do not assume that the measured net worth of rms is zero.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
Associated with this balance sheet matrix is the transaction ow matrix in table 2.
Household real wage income (WrL) can be supplemented by new borrowing ( _ DW) to nance
the sum of consumption (CW) and interest on past borrowing (iDW). Rentiers earn income on
their net deposits (iDW+iDF), which they use for consumption (CR) or to make new deposits
( _ DW + _ DF). In the case of rms, we distinguish between capital and current transactions.
Firms can nance investment (I) with new borrowing ( _ DF) or retained earnings (F). As
in Hein (2006), there is no publicly held equity; in this sense, capitalists are identical to
rms. Related to this, rms retain all earnings net of debt service. For simplicity, a common
interest rate (i) applies to consumer and corporate debt, and we do not distinguish between
the borrowing rate and the lending rate. For the transaction matrix, we note that the sums
across the rows must equal zero as a consistency condition. The columns also sum to zero,
reecting budget constraints.
[ Table 2 about here. ]
52.2 Banks and Firms
Our specication of banking sector follows Lavoie and Godley (2002), similarly distinguishing
the capital and current accounts. We refer to nancial intermediaries as \banks" and non-
nancial businesses as \rms". All lending is intermediated by the banking sector. Banks
are pure intermediaries that do not generate prots: deposit and loan rates are identical.
Rentiers hold saving deposits with banks, on which they receive intermediated interest pay-
ments. Firms and workers may receive these bank deposits as bank loans, with which they
can nance investment or consumption.
Firms are characterized by their investment demand behavior and markup pricing be-
havior. We treat the pricing behavior of rms in standard neo-Kaleckian fashion: price is
a markup over unit labor costs, reecting an oligopolistic market structure (Harris, 1974;
Asimakopulos, 1975).
P = (1 + )WnL=Y (1)
Here P > 0 is the price level, Wn > 0 is the nominal wage,  > 0 is the constant markup
rate (which represents Kalecki's degree of monopoly), and L=Y > 0 is the labor-output ratio
(i.e., the inverse of the average product of labor). Such markup pricing behavior implies a





Since the prot share is directly determined by the markup, our exposition below will often
treat  as a model parameter. Recalling the discussion in section 2.1, we see that gross prot
() is split between retained earnings (F) and debt service (iDF).
 = F + iDF (3)
Let r = =K denote the gross prot rate, rF = F=K denote the retained earnings rate, and
6dF = DF=K denote the leverage ratio (corporate debt/capital). Then we can decompose the
gross prot rate into the sum of the retained earnings rate and the average cost of capital.
r = rF + idF (4)
The retained earnings rate plays a central role in our characterization of investment
demand. Many empirical studies nd retained earnings or \cash ow" to be an important
determinant of investment (Fazzari and Mott, 1986-1987; Fazzari et al., 1988; Chirinko and
Schaller, 1995; Ndikumana, 1999; Chirinko et al., 1999). As in Jarsulic (1996) and Charles
(2008a), our desired investment rate (gK = I=K) therefore responds to the retained earnings
rate (rF).
gK = 0 + rrF (5)
Here 0 captures \animal spirits" (the state of business condence), and r captures the
sensitivity of desired investment to retained earnings. The parameters are positive, and we
will make the standard assumption that r < 1.3
Note that the gross prot rate can be simply expressed in terms of the capacity utilization
rate (u = Y=K). This allows us to reduce the expression for the retained earnings rate and
thereby for the accumulation rate.
r = u (6)
rF = u   idF (7)
gK = 0 + r(u   idF) (8)
2.3 Workers and Rentiers
As indicated by the social accounting matrix in table 2, workers can borrow to raise their
consumption above their current income. Correspondingly, workers must pay interest on
any outstanding consumer debt. As Dutt (2006) emphasizes, the traditional neo-Kaleckian
7consumption function|in which workers consume all their wage income each period|does
not allow for these considerations. To allow for debt nanced consumption, we incorporate
two modications of the aggregate consumption function: we explicitly account for the
payment of interest on consumer debt, and we include a term that captures the inuence of
aggregate credit conditions on consumer spending.4
CW = WrL   iDW + (DW   DW) (9)
The term WrL iDW is after-interest disposable income. Here  > 0 is an adjustment coe-
cient, and the \aggregate credit target" DW summarizes current consumer-credit conditions
in the macroeconomy. Our formulation of the consumption behavior of workers encompasses
models that constrain it to equal current wages (with DW; = 0).
When accumulated consumer borrowing is below the credit target, the average consumer
can borrow, allowing the aggregate consumption of workers to exceed their after-interest
disposable income.5 When there is an increase in DW, consumption spending increases. Note
that DW regulates credit ows but not the outstanding stock of credit, which is determined
historically.
Recall that the workers' budget constraint from Table 2 requires that _ DW = CW +iDW  
WrL. Therefore (9) implies a simple adjustment process for consumer indebtedness, similar
to the continuous time formation of Dutt (2005) and the discrete time formulation of Palley
(1994).
_ DW = (DW   DW): (10)
From (2) we know the share of real wages in income is 1    = 1=(1 + ), so we can
rewrite the worker's consumption function (9) as
CW = (1   )Y   iDW + (DW   DW) (11)
8In our model, rentiers are the recipients of interest income. In contrast with workers,
rentiers simply consume a fraction of their interest income.
CR = (1   sR)(iDF + iDW) (12)
Here sR is the saving rate of rentiers. From a portfolio perspective the model has eectively
one asset; rentiers treat consumer debt and corporate debt as perfect substitutes. Recalling
that the rentiers' budget constraint in Table 2 requires CR = i(DF +DW) ( _ DF + _ DW), we
nd that (12) implies the following stock/ow linkage:
_ DF + _ DW = sRi(DF + DW) (13)
It follows that the saving behavior of rentiers is a key determinant of the growth rate of gross
indebtedness in the economy.
3 Temporary Equilibrium
Commodity market equilibrium in this model has a standard representation:
Y = CW + CR + I (14)
As usual, we restrict our analysis to economically meaningful conditions by assuming ag-
gregate demand is positive. Substituting from the consumption equations (11) and (12)
and normalizing all variables by the capital stock produces our preferred representation of
commodity market equilibrium.
u = (1   )u   idW + (dW   dW) + (1   sR)i(dW + dF) + gK (15)
9Recall that u = Y=K denotes capacity utilization. Here dW = DW=K denotes the normalized
indebtedness of workers and dW = DW=K denotes the exogenous consumer credit target.
(Exogeneity of dW implies that DW is scaled to the size of the economy.) After substituting
from the investment demand equation (8) and solving for u, we nd a reduced form expression





[(dW   dW)   sRidW + (1   sR   r)idF + 0] (16)
Substituting (16) into (6), (7), and (8), we produce reduced forms for the prot rate, the












[0 + r(dW   dW)   rsRi(dW + dF)] (19)
3.1 Comparative Statics
This section presents the comparative static analysis of temporary equilibrium. When pos-
sible, we sign the response of u, r, and gK to changes in the model parameters. Table 3
summarizes the results.6
[ Table 3 about here. ]
It is straightforward to sign most of the comparative statics. The interest rate proves
most ambiguous. Consider rst the eect of an increase in i. This aects the economy
through a consumer debt channel and a corporate debt channel.
10Consider rst the consumer debt channel. For any positive level of consumer debt, a
higher interest rate increases rentiers' income and correspondingly reduces workers' after-
interest disposable income. The net eect is lower eective demand, since workers have a
higher marginal propensity to consume than rentiers.
Consider next the corporate debt channel. An increase in the interest rate causes a
reduction in retained earnings for any positive level of corporate debt, and hence a fall
in investment demand. On the other hand, there is a corresponding increase in rentiers'
consumption, since they are now collecting more interest income from rms.
Generally, the net eect is ambiguous, as indicated in Table 3. Looking at equation (16),
we see that this ambiguity arises from the term (1   sR   r). Although both r and sR
are less than one, their sum may well exceed 1. At issue is whether increased corporate
debt payments reduce investment more than they raise rentier consumption. (See Onaran
et al. (2011) for a recent discussion.) A key assumption of Charles (2008a) is that they
do: (1   sR   r) < 0. (This also corresponds to the \normal case" of Hein (2006).) For
ease of reference, we will refer to this as the \rentier-saving assumption". For dF > 0, this
assumption ensures a negative impact of interest rate though the corporate debt channel. If
we also have dW > 0, this further ensures a negative overall aect on u and r. For reasons
explained in the next section, it is also interesting to note that if dW =  dF > 0 then the
eect is denitely negative.7
Related but simpler considerations apply to the impact eect of change in corporate
debt. Higher corporate debt results in higher interest payment for rms, cutting retained
earnings and reducing accumulation. At the same time, it also results in higher interest
income for rentiers, leading to higher consumption. The overall impact on u and r is there-
fore ambiguous. Taylor (2004) suggests distinguishing between debt-led and debt-burdened
eective demand, which depends on the relative magnitudes of these eects. Here we nd
it necessary to draw a slightly ner distinction. In general, higher corporate debt has an
ambiguous eect on eective demand. Under the rentier-saving assumption, however, the ef-
11fect is denitely negative. Furthermore, even without the rentier-saving assumption, greater
corporate debt suppresses growth by suppressing the accumulation rate. In this sense growth
is denitely debt-burdened.
The eects of consumer indebtedness are somewhat easier to trace. An increase in the
credit target dW allows workers to increase their consumption spending. The resulting in-
crease in eective demand increases capacity utilization, which in turn increases the prot
rate and thereby the rate of accumulation. (Dutt (2006) obtains a similar result in a model
of consumer debt.) Unsurprisingly then, an increase in the level of consumer indebtedness
(dW) has the opposite eects. Higher consumer debt implies higher interest payments for
workers and more income for rentiers. Since workers have the higher propensity to consume,
this reduces total consumption. The result is lower capacity utilization, retained earnings,
and investment.
Finally, an increase in the prot share () redistributes income away from workers, re-
ducing consumption demand. This decline in eective demand reduces capacity utilization
in proportion. As in Charles (2008a), our neo-Kaleckian model of debt dynamics is wage-led
or \stagnationist" (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Blecker, 2002).
4 Dynamics
In this section we analyze the debt-dynamics implied by our model. The debt accumulation
of rms, _ dF, is determined by the transactions ows in Table 2. We see that when investment
spending exceeds retained earnings, rms must engage in debt nance. We therefore have
_ dF = gK   rF   gKdF (20)
Although (20) is simple and intuitive, when we combine it with the behavior of consumer
debt, the dynamics become somewhat complex. We will therefore rst consider a special
case: the model in the absence of consumer debt. This will serve two purposes. First, the
12model without consumer debt is more easily compared to the extant neo-Kaleckian literature
on debt dynamics, most of which focuses on the role of corporate debt (Lavoie, 1995; Hein,
2006; Charles, 2008a,b). Second, the special-case dynamics provide a point of comparison
for the dynamics of the full model, which will illustrate how the addition of consumer debt
alters the short-run and long-run predictions of the model.
4.1 The Case of dW = 0
In the absence of consumer debt, the consumption functions for workers and rentiers simplify:
CW = WrL (21)
CR = (1   sR)iDF (22)
The rest of the structural model is unchanged. We can now simplify (16){(19), the temporary-
equilibrium solutions for capacity utilization (u), the prot rate (r), the retained earnings
















(0   rsRidF) (26)
The comparative statistic results in Table 3 are preserved. The dynamics of this special-
case model are summarized by the behavior of dF. From (25) and (26) we see that gK rF =
sRidF, which we combine with (20) to conclude that
_ dF = (sRi   gK)dF (27)
13This suggests two steady states. The rst (dF 1) involves the natural steady-state condition
sRi = gK (28)
This just says that in a steady state, debt must grow at the same rate as the capital stock.
In the second steady state (dF 2 = 0), investment is nanced purely by internal funds.
Substituting from (26) into (28) and solving for dF produces
dF 1 =
0   (1   r)sRi
rsRi
(29)
Thus dF 1 could be either positive or negative depending on the magnitude of 0 relative to
(1   r)sRi. Note that r, sR, and i are fractions, which makes the term (1   r)sRi very
small. We therefore assume
0 > (1   r)sRi (30)
This means that animal spirits are high enough to ensure dF 1 > 0, and that the capital stock
is partly debt nanced at this steady state.
Next consider the stability of our steady states. Starting from (27) then substituting






(dF 1   2dF) (31)
Since we know dF 1 > 0, (31) implies dF 2 is a stable steady-state. Correspondingly, dF 1 is an
unstable steady state. Figure 1 illustrates this in a univariate phase diagram.
It is easy to understand why the steady-state at dF 1 is unstable. At this steady state,
the saving of rentiers is just adequate to meet the demand to debt nance the capital stock.
Consider a slight reduction in dF, attributable to a decline in DF. This reduces the debt-
service payments of rms, which then have more internal funds available for investment. The
capital stock grows more quickly in response, driving dF lower yet.
14[ Figure 1 about here. ]
Our special-case (dW = 0) model bears a substantial resemblance to the model of Hein
(2006). However our results dier. First of all, our comparative statics results do not show
any possibility of a positive relationship between the interest rate and the accumulation rate
(Hein's \puzzling case"). This dierence traces to the absence in our model of an explicit
accelerator eect, which Hein includes in his investment function. There is also a dierence
in the steady state properties: our model cannot possess a stable steady state at a positive
debt-capital ratio, while a stable steady state at a positive level is a possibility and a focal
point of the analysis in Hein's study.8
Our special-case model also bears comparison to Charles (2008a). Charles includes an
endogenous retention ratio, but if we restrict the retention ratio to unity (sf = 1), his model
becomes essentially identical to our special-case model. Charles reports the existence of
multiple equilibria, with the unstable equilibrium at higher levels of the corporate leverage
and retention ratios. This result depends on the magnitude the exogenous interest rate.
In our model, the magnitude of the interest rate is irrelevant to the existence of multiple
equilibria. Nevertheless, a higher interest rate brings the stable and unstable equilibria closer
together, as in Charles's model.
4.2 Adding Consumer Debt
We have seen that even the special case with only corporate debt has multiple steady states.
We now analyze the macrodynamics of the complete model, including both corporate and
consumer debt.
Recall that we used the capital nancing constraint ( _ DF = I  F, from the transaction
ows matrix) to conclude in (20) that the leverage ratio grows when investment exceeds
retained earnings: _ dF = gK  rF  gKdF. In the absence of consumer debt, we could simply
equate rentier saving to the nancing needs of rms: this immediately produced (27), from
which we derived a reduced form for _ dF. But now rentier saving must nance two types of
15loans. To see the implications of this, use the reduced forms for rF and gK, (18) and (19),
to conclude that
gK   rF = sRi(dW + dF)   (dW   dW) (32)
Once again we have a natural interpretation: for capital accumulation to exceed the available
internal funds, it must be nanced by borrowing. The ability of banks to extend net new
loans still depends on the saving of rentiers, but now rentier saving must nance consumption
borrowing as well as corporate borrowing.
To produce the reduced form for _ dF, recall from (20) that _ dF = (1   dF)gK   rF, so we
can again use (18) and (19) to conclude that
_ dF =
(1   r + dFr)
(1   r)




Next consider consumer debt. From the denition of dW, we see that
_ dW = (dW   dW)   gKdW (34)




[(1   r   rdW)(dW   dW) + rsRidW(dW + dF)   0dW] (35)
4.2.1 Steady States
Steady states lie at the intersection of the nullclines, _ dF = 0 and _ dW = 0, and so must satisfy
the necessary condition _ dF + _ dW = 0. Combining our two equations of motion, (33) and
(35), we nd
_ dF + _ dW = (sRi   gK)(dF + dW) (36)
Recalling our discussion of (27), this again suggests two dierent type of steady states: one
type where sRi = gK, and one type where dF + dW = 0. In the rst type of steady state,
16debt must grow at the same rate as the steady-state capital stock. At the second type of
steady state, we have a kind of \euthanasia of the rentier". (The steady-state values of the
variables dW and dF have the same magnitude but opposite signs, so net rentier income is
zero.)
We now consider the individual nullclines in more detail. Equation (33) implies that
along the _ dF = 0 nullcline we have




dW   sRidF +
0dF
1   r + rdF

(37)
That is, dW is a nonlinear function of dF along the nullcline. Similarly, along the _ dW = 0
nullcline we have
dFj _ dW=0 =
 1
rsRidW
[(1   r   rdW)(dW   dW)   0dW]   dW (38)
That is, dF is a nonlinear function of dW along this nullcline.
Due to the nonlinearities in the system, there are three steady state solutions. Recalling
our discussion of (36), consider rst a steady state characterized by the condition gK = sRi.
This is particularly easy to nd, because after setting _ dW = 0 in (34) we can use this






Again using our condition gK = sRi but now invoking (19), we nd that (39) implies the





[0   (1   r)sRi] (40)
The point (dF
B;dW
B) is represented by point B in Figure 2, which illustrates the phase
diagram for this system. From (39) and (40) we see that at point B we have dW > 0 and
dF > 0. (Recall (30), and see the upcoming discussion of stability for details.)
17[ Figure 2 about here. ]
To nd the other two steady states, we set _ dF = 0 and _ dW = 0 in (33) and (35), and we
additionally impose the condition that dW + dF = 0. We nd
dF =  dW =  






 = [0 + (1   r + rdW)]
2   4dW(1   r)r
2 (42)
These steady states are represented by points A and C in Figure 2, the phase diagram for
the debt dynamics of our model. From (41) we know dF < 0 and dW > 0 at A and C.9 It also
follows that dW
A < dW and dW
B > dW. We might say that steady state C is characterized
by excessive debt accumulation, in the sense that dW exceeds the value targeted under the
prevailing consumer credit conditions.
4.3 Stability
We conduct our stability analysis by considering linear approximations to our nonlinear
system near the steady states. Characterize our system as
_ dF = F(dF;dW;:::) _ dW = W(dF;dW;:::) (43)
























[(r   1)   0   r(dW   2dW) + rsRi(2dW + dF)]
(45)
Consider the steady state B in Figure 2, characterized by the condition gK = sRi. We
evaluate the Jacobian at (dF
B;dW








0   (1   r)sRi 0(1 + =sRi)







(sRi + )[0   sRi(1   r)] + isRrdW
1   r
(47)
Recalling (30), we see that the determinant is certainly negative. This means that the steady
state at point B is a saddle point.
Next, consider the two steady states that are characterized by the condition dW +dF = 0.





   2i(1   r)sR   (1   r   rdW)
2(1   r)
(48)
where  is dened in (42). Since
p
 > 0 + (1   r(1 + dW)) and since 0 > sRi(1   r),






   2sRi(1   r)   (1   r   dWr))
2(1   r)2 (49)
and the same considerations tell us detJA > 0. The negative trace and positive determinant
19imply that point A is a stable steady state. Similar arguments tell use that at point C the
trace and determinant are positive, so that point C is an unstable steady state.
As in the special-case (dW = 0) model of section 4.1, the key determinant of dynamic
stability is the investment nancing behavior of the rms. An increase in dF reduces the
retained earning rate rF, which reduces the investment rate but still induces the rm to
borrow more. If investment remains high enough that the capital stock is increasing faster
than corporate debt, the increase in the leverage ratio will be reversed. That is the case
in a stable region, such as near point A in Figure 2. In an unstable region, however, the
process is explosive: rising debt service payments create rising borrowing needs, in a process
reminiscent of Minsky's \Ponzi state" of corporate nance.
4.4 Steady-State Responses
In this section we briey present some steady-state comparative-statics results (sometimes
referred to as \comparative dynamics"). Such experiments are sensible only near a stable
steady state, so we concentrate our analysis on point A in Figure 2.
Begin by substituting  dW for dF in (16){(19) to obtain the following characterizations
















[0 + r(dW   dW)] (53)
20In order to calculate the implied steady-state responses, we must account for the long-
run endogeneity of dW. Recall our solution for dF and dW at point A, as given by (41). We
immediately see that @dW
A=@i = @dW






















(Reverse the signs to get the responses of dF
A.) Examining (42), we nd that we can re-
express  as
 = (0   (1   r   rdW))
2 + 40(1   r) (55)
This immediately implies that 1 > @dW
A=@dW > 0. Similarly, we can re-express  as
 = (0 + (1   r + rdW))
2   4
2dWr(1   r) (56)
which immediately implies that @dW
A=@0 < 0. With this information, we are able to
produce the results in Table 4.
[ Table 4 about here. ]
An increase in the interest rate has a negative eect on the long-run values of capacity
utilization and the prot rate, but has no eect on retained earnings and the growth rate.
Keep in mind that at point A, rms are net lenders but workers are net borrowers. An
increase in the interest rate reduces worker consumption by reducing after-interest dispos-
able income, and the resulting fall in demand depresses capacity utilization. The fall in
consumer demand osets the extra interest income received by rms, so they do not increase
investment. Contrast this with the results of Dutt (2006) and Hein (2006). In a model of
consumer debt, Dutt nds a negative eect of a higher interest rate on long run growth,
while Hein nds a positive eect in a model of corporate debt.10 Our model includes both
consumer and corporate debt, and we nd no eect on the steady state growth rate.
21In a model of corporate debt with a variable retention ratio, Charles (2008a) nds that
positive interest-rate shocks can induce additional equilibria at positive levels of corporate
debt. That is not the case in our model. Nevertheless, we do observe an interesting eect on
macroeconomic stability. As illustrated in Figure 3, an increase in the interest rate shifts B
to B'. This reduces the size of the stable region in the rst quadrant. For example, consider
an economy initially at point E. Before the illustrated interest-rate shock, the economy is on
a stable trajectory. After the shock, the economy is on an unstable trajectory. In this sense,
interest-rate shocks can destabilize the macroeconomy.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The most prominent results of Table 4 involve the eect of aggregate demand on long-run
growth. For example, more ebullient \animal spirits" are represented by an increase in 0. In
a neo-Kaleckian macromodel, we expect to nd that increased optimism stimulates growth.
And indeed, here we nd that an increase in 0 increases rF and therefore gK. The eect on
output outweighs the eect on the capital stock, so capacity utilization and the prot rate
also increase. These are conventional results from a demand-driven growth model.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 illustrates this increase in what Keynes (1936) also called \spontaneous opti-
mism". This shifts the saddle point from point B to B0. Greater optimism also produces
a larger stable region. For example, consider an economy initially at point B, where eco-
nomic growth just osets the growth in consumer and corporate debt. A surge in condence
will increase the accumulation rate, driving down dF and dW. Conversely a decrease in the
state of condence can shrink the stable region. An economy on a stable macroeconomic
trajectory (for example, at point E) can be destabilized by a sizable decrease in condence.
A nal experiment is of particular interest in our model. An increase in the consumer
credit target is another possible source of increased demand. The additional demand raises
22the retained earnings rate and stimulates growth: gK denitely increases, even in the long-
run. That is, the model predicts that looser consumer credit conditions increase long-run
growth. Since both output and the capital stock increase, there is an ambiguous eect on
steady-state capacity utilization (and therefore on the prot rate).
Although increased borrowing by workers implies higher consumption, it leads to a shift
in income from workers to rentiers, who are higher saving agents. Indeed, in a model of
consumer debt dynamics, Dutt (2006, p.355) argues that this mechanism underpins an am-
biguity in the impact of looser credit conditions on long-run economic growth. We nd
that the eect on growth is positive, but we do see an ambiguity in the eect on capacity
utilization. Related to this, one might reasonably wonder if whether the resulting increase
in dW might eventually exceed the increase in dW, putting additional downward pressure on
demand and growth. However we know from (54) that this cannot happen.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 illustrates the eect of looser consumer credit conditions. As with an increase
in \animal spirits", we see that an increase in the consumer credit target enlarges the stable
region of the economy. For example, consider an economy initially at point B. At that point,
the economic growth rate of the economy just osets increases in consumer and corporate
debt. The increase in demand will augment retained earnings and increase investment,
reducing the magnitude of dF and dW. Similarly, an economy initially at point E is on an
unstable macroeconomic trajectory. An increase in the consumer credit target can enlarge
the stable region enough to encompass this point. In this sense, looser consumer credit
conditions promote macroeconomic stability.
In sum, our results suggest that interest rate increases can be destabilizing while increases
in autonomous demand can promote system stability (in the sense of increasing the size of the
stable region). We explored two sources of increased aggregate demand: a surge in animal
spirits, and looser consumer credit conditions. In the context of the present paper, the
23second experiment is particularly interesting. Looser consumer credit conditions contribute
to macroeconomic stability and long-run growth.
5 Concluding Remarks
Researchers have demonstrated that corporate borrowing behavior is an important determi-
nant of macrodynamic outcomes. The few macroeconomic models that explicitly consider
consumer debt nd that the willingness of workers to borrow also matters. Related to this,
household borrowing has been broadly implicated in the Great Recession of 2007{2009. We
therefore weave together threads from the two literatures, developing and analyzing a neo-
Kaleckian growth model with consumer as well as corporate debt.
In order to allow ready comparisons to the literature, we initially analyze a restricted
version of our model: the special case of no consumer debt. We show that this special-case
model has substantial overlap with the existing neo-Kaleckian literature on corporate-debt
dynamics, including the existence of multiple steady states.
Despite the apparent complexity of our full model, which considers both consumer and
corporate debt, the dynamic analysis eventually proves tractable. We nd important simi-
larities to our special-case model. For example, the stable equilibrium is characterized by a
kind of \euthanasia of the rentier".
We also nd that some predictions of our model dier from the predictions of existing
models. For example, the Dutt (2006) model of consumer debt predicts that higher interest
rates reduce long run growth, while Hein (2006) presents a model of corporate debt and
predicts a positive eect. In our model of consumer and corporate debt dynamics, we nd no
interest-rate eect on steady state growth. (However, higher interest rates do reduce capacity
utilization and the prot rate, and they can contribute to macroeconomic instability.)
Our analysis suggests that the distinction between consumer and corporate debt is impor-
tant. Incorporating both into a single model is a substantial extension of the neo-Kaleckian
24literature on debt dynamics. In line with the results of simpler models, we nd that a surge
in animal spirits is good for steady-state growth. Naturally consumer borrowing can also
help to sustain aggregate demand, so we suspect and conrm that looser consumer credit
conditions have a similar steady-state eect. We also show that such demand augmenting
changes enhance the stability of the system, in that they enlarge the stable region. However,
a surge in animal spirits must increase long-run capacity utilization and the prot rate, while
looser credit conditions may not.
Our model remains tractable despite the presence of both indebted consumers and lever-
aged rms. Further extensions to the model may push the bounds of analytical tractability.
Nevertheless, we close by mentioning a few useful extensions of the model that we would like
to pursue. Most important, we would like to include a mechanism to enforce rm solvency
outside the steady state. This extension can be expected to introduce substantial additional
non-linearity into the model and may require the use of simulation techniques. Related
to this, we would like to add portfolio considerations to the behavior of lenders. Highly
leveraged rms should face credit rationing unless they have exceptional growth rates. As
a nal extension of this line of thought, we would like to consider (in Minsky's terms) both
borrowers' and lenders' risks. This remains a critical and inadequately recognized limitation
of eorts to incorporate Minskyan nancial instability in Kaleckian macromodels (Lavoie,
1995; Hein, 2006; Charles, 2008a,b).
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29Notes
1Charles (2008a) endogenizes the retention ratio of the rm. Charles (2008b) links nan-
cial structure (as dened by Minsky) to capital accumulation.
2As of the rst quarter of 2011, household debt outstanding as a share of GDP is about 89
percent, and the ratio of personal outlays to disposable personal income is about 94 percent.
Personal outlays, disposable personal income, and GDP data are available from Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Household debt data is available from the Flow of Funds accounts of
the United States, published by the Federal Reserve.
3 Such a restriction on the marginal propensity to spend is standard in Neo-Kaleckian
macromodels. It is usually justied in terms of an implicit short run stability condition.
To see why, let very short term output adjustment (_ u) depend positively on excess demand
ed = (C +I  Y )=K. Examining d_ u=du near an equilibrium, we obtain r < 1 as a stability
condition. This condition ensures that investment responds less strongly than aggregate
saving to an increase in capacity utilization. Ceteris paribus, an additional unit of income
will generate (1   ) units of consumption and  units of retained earnings, of which r
will be used for new investment. If we were to have r > 1, a rise in income would increase
excess demand.
4Our use of the term \credit conditions" is rather broad: it is intended to summarize the
nancial practices of both lenders and borrowers, as inuenced by institutional and cultural
norms. (Thus it plays a similar role to the \desired level of borrowing" of Dutt (2006).)
Our formulation is a tractable but ad hoc representation of such inuences, and a natural
extension would be to allow DW to respond to changes in economic conditions. Note that
DW is appropriately scaled to the size of the economy, as described in section 3.
5Although our aggregate credit target is not the same as a credit limit at the micro level,
30we are inclined to nd some support for our macroeconomic story in the microeconomic
empirical evidence of Gross and Souleles (2002). Using US data on a panel of thousands of
individual credit card accounts, they found that consumers increased their credit card debt
following increases in their credit limits.
6Recall r < 1. (For a discussion, see footnote 3.)
7 With positive net debt, in contrast to Hein's model, our model does not suggest any
possibility of a positive response of the accumulation rate to an increase in the interest rate.
(This is the \puzzling" case of Lavoie (1995).) To produce that, we could add an accelerator
eect to our investment function (i.e., a positive response of the accumulation rate to u).
Hein also includes a positive response of the markup to the interest rate, but we consider
the evidence to speak against that assumption (Nekarda and Ramey, 2010).
8 Comparison with the reported results of Hein (2006) is complicated by lacunae in his
discussion. Hein's model could have a steady state at a negative leverage ratio. He gives
little attention to this possibility, and he ignores a steady state at zero leverage level. Related
to this, his discussion of stability of equilibrium depends on an implicit assumption that the
equilibrium leverage ratio must be positive. (That is, in his notation, he requires d^ =d < 0
rather than d_ =d < 0.) Comparing his equation (22) to our equation (31) by setting his
 = 0, we see that his stability analysis is problematic. In this sense, our explication of our
special-case model provides a partial correction of Hein's analysis.
9This follows from [0 + (1   r + rdW)] >
p
 > 0. To see that  > 0, expand  and
then regroup to get  = [0 + (1   r(1 + dW))]2 + 40rdW, which is positive since all
parameters are positive.
10However, recall our discussion in footnote 8.
31A Tables and Figures
A.1 Tables
Table 1: Balance Sheet Matrix
Workers Rentiers Firms Banks Sum
Capital 0 0 K 0 K
Deposits 0 DW + DF 0  (DW + DF) 0
Loans  DW 0  DF DW + DF 0
Net worth  DW DW + DF K   DF 0 K
Table 2: Transaction Flow Matrix
Firms Banks
Workers Rentiers Current Capital Current Capital
Consumption  CW  CR CW + CR 0 0 0
Investment 0 0 I  I 0 0
Wages WrL 0  WrL 0 0 0
Firms' prots 0 0  F F 0 0
Deposit interest 0 i(DW + DF) 0 0  i(DW + DF) 0
Loan interest  iDW 0  iDF 0 i(DW + DF) 0
Deposit ows 0  ( _ DW + _ DF) 0 0 0 ( _ DW + _ DF)
Loan ows _ DW 0 0 _ DF 0  ( _ DW + _ DF)
Table 3: Short-Run Comparative Statics
0  i dF dW dW sR
u +   ? sgn(1   r   sR)   + -sgn(dF + dW)
r + 0 ? sgn(1   r   sR)   + -sgn(dF + dW)
rF + 0 -sgn(dF + dW)     + -sgn(dF + dW)
gK + 0 -sgn(dF + dW)     + -sgn(dF + dW)
32Table 4: Steady-State Responses
0  i dW sR
u +     ? 0
r + 0   ? 0
rF + 0 0 + 0
gK + 0 0 + 0
33A.2 Figures
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Figure 5: Looser Credit Conditions
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